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I. Introduction
In Microsoft v. AT&T, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Microsoft did not
infringe AT&T's software patent under 35 U.S.C. 5 271(o.1 The issue in the
case was largely one of statutory interpretation, to which the Court applied a
strict textual approach. 2 However, applying a different theory of statutory
interpretation, namely purposivism, would have yielded a radically different
holding. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's application of
purposivism in interpreting 5 271(0 led to a finding that Microsoft did
infringe AT&T's software patent. 3
Both the textual and purposivist theories of statutory interpretation, as
well as the third major theory of statutory interpretation-intentionalism-
boast advantages, but also suffer flaws. All three theories are in tension with
# University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2010; Northwestern
University, B.S. in Biomedical Engineering.
1. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007).
2. Id. at 452-54.
3. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (Fed. Cit. 2005).
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each other, and no one theory has proven itself as the dominant theory of
interpretation. 4 This note argues that in the context of patent law, strict
textualism should rarely, if ever, prevail in statutory interpretation. Rather,
purposivism should be a driving force behind the interpretation of patent
statutes. This conclusion is largely based on an analysis of claim construction
doctrines in patent law.
First, this note provides background on the three foundational theories of
statutory interpretation. Then, this note discusses the Supreme Court's
textualist analysis in interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in Microsoft v. AT&T 5 and
contrasts this analysis to the Federal Circuit's purposivist approach in
interpreting the same statute. 6  Next, this note explores the problems
associated with textualism in patent law, such as in Microsoft v. AT&T. Finally,
this note examines the rationales behind certain claim construction doctrines
in patent law and submits that those same rationales vouch for a purposivist
approach to interpreting patent statutes. Accordingly, this note concludes
that patent statutes are particularly iU-suited candidates for textualism, but
particularly well-suited candidates for purposivism. As such, this note argues
that the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of § 271(f) was too strict,
while the Federal Circuit's statutory interpretation of § 271(f) was more
appropriate.
II. Background
A. The Three Foundational Theories of Statutory Interpretation
The three foundational theories of statutory interpretation are textualism,
intentionalism, and purposivism. 7 Textualism gives the words of the statute
primacy-statutes are interpreted by focusing on the apparent literal
commands of the statutory text. 8 Textualism is related to the "plain meaning
rule," which gives the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning.9
Intentionalism aims to uncover the intent of the legislature enacting the
statute. 10 Specifically, intentionalism looks into how the legislature would
have resolved the specific fact situation before the court by examining the
legislative history in order to glean what the legislature intended when it
4. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretafion as Pratical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (1990).
5. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449.
6. AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1371.
7. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 324.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 340.
10. Id. at 324.
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enacted the statute." Purposivism calls for identifying the purpose behind a
statute and interpreting the statute in a way that furthers that purpose. 12
Purposivism grew out of the "mischief rule." This rule provides that a court
should determine the mischief the legislature targeted in enacting a statute,
and then apply that statute to expunge that mischief as presented in the
current fact situation. 13
Purposivism is different from, and more flexible than, intentionalism
because purposivism does not focus on how the legislature would have
handled the specific fact situation before the court.14 Rather, purposivism
looks to the general purpose that motivated enactment of the statute.15 To
draw an analogy to criminal law, intentionalism is to specific intent as
purposivism is to general intent. 16
Purposivism is also more flexible than textualism because purposivism is
not limited by the fixed words of the statute.1 7 In contrast to purposivism,
textualism might bring about an interpretation that is completely at odds with
the purpose of the statute. 18 For example, in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, the plaintiff attacked affirmative action in the employment context, by
using a textual interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965.1 9
The Supreme Court recognized that a literal textual interpretation of the
statute would prohibit affirmative action because the statute made it unlawful
to "discriminate . .. because of . . . race" in employment. 20 Nevertheless,
guided by the purpose of the statute-the integration of blacks into
mainstream American society-the Court upheld affirmative action.21
Textualism proponents counter that it is the words that Congress enacted into
law and not the legislature's purpose or intent, and thus it is the words which
carry the force of law.22
11. Id. at 326.
12. Id. at 324.
13. WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 77 (John F. O'Connell &
Bruce Comly French eds., West Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1984) (1975).
14. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 332-33.
15. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1124 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Synposium on Statutog Inteipretalion: Legislafive History Values, 66
CH1.-KENT. L. REv. 365, 367 (1990).
17. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 340.
18. Id. at 333.
19. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 201-02.
22. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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This note analyzes how the justifications and flaws behind these statutory
interpretation theories pan out in patent law, in particular by focusing on the
Federal Circuit's statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 5 271(f) in AT&T v.
Microsoft 23 and the Supreme Court's review thereof.24
B. The Supreme Court's Textualism in Microsoft v. AT&T
In Microsoft v. AT&T, the Supreme Court adhered to textualism in
interpreting 35 U.S.C. 5 271(f) and struck down the Federal Circuit's
purposivist approach of interpretation. 25 Generally, patent law is territorial-
an owner of a United States patent has rights only within the United States. 26
However, § 271(f) allows a U.S. patent owner to reach certain acts of
infringement that fall outside of the U.S.27
In Microsoft v. AT&T, the Supreme Court held that Microsoft's Windows
operating system incorporated software that infringed AT&T's software
patent, but only when Windows was installed and run on a computer. 28
However, Windows, in the abstract, such as Windows on a CD in a box in a
store, did not infringe AT&T's patent. 29 Microsoft made a master copy of
Windows in the United States and shipped it abroad, where foreign
manufactures made copies from that master copy.30 The foreign
manufacturers then installed those copies on foreign computers. 31
AT&T filed suit against Microsoft alleging that it was liable as an infringer
under 5 271(f), 32 which assigns liability to whoever, without authority, supplies
or causes to be supplied in or from the United States:
(1) all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in
part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that would
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United
States ... [or]
(2) any component of a patented invention that is especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
23. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
24. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
25. Id. at 457.
26. Id. at 444.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 271() (2006).
28. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 446.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 445-46.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 441-42.
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commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing
that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such
component will be combined outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States.. .. 33
At issue in this case was whether Microsoft supplied "components"
within the meaning of 5 271(f), consequently making it liable for infringing
AT&T's patent. 34 If "components" referred to the copies of Windows that
were generated and installed on computers abroad, Microsoft would not have
supplied "components" because Microsoft only supplied the master copy, not
the copies that were actually installed on computers abroad. 35 In contrast, if
"components" referred to Windows in the abstract-without a physical
embodiment-Microsoft would have supplied a "component" and would
hence be liable under 5 271(f).36 The District Court found Microsoft liable
and the Federal Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling.37
The Supreme Court began its opinion by interpreting the term
"components" in 5 271(f). 38 The Court reasoned that "components" must be
amenable to combination because the text of 5 271(f) indicated as much. 39
Section 271(f)(1) provides that it applies to "components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components. '40
Windows in the abstract, detached from a physical medium, is not amenable
to combination. 41 Thus, the Court held that Windows in the abstract did not
qualify as a "component" under § 271 (f). 42
The Court's textualism stands in stark contrast to the purposivist
approach the Federal Circuit adopted in interpreting 5 271(f). 43 The Federal
Circuit rejected such a reading of "component" because doing so would
create a loophole through 5 271(f), making it easy to avoid liability.44 This
33. 35 U.S.C. § 271(o.
34. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 447.
35. Id. at 448-49.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 447.
38. Id. at 449.
39. Id.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (0(1).
41. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449-50.
42. Id. at 452.
43. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
44. Id.
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was especially true for software patents because software is easily copied. 45
Instead, the Federal Circuit focused on the remedial nature of § 271(f) and
condemned a technical avoidance of the statute that ignored technological
advances developed after § 271(f) was enacted. 46  The Federal Circuit
elaborated that if Microsoft were allowed to avoid infringement, the court
would be "subverting the remedial nature of § 271(f, permitting a technical
avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances in a field of technology-
and its associated industry practices-that developed after the enactment of §
271(f)."47  Hence, the court explained that "[§] 271 0, if it is to remain
effective, must therefore be interpreted in a manner that is appropriate to the
nature of the technology at issue. '48
The legislature designed the remedial nature of § 271(f) to remedy the
mischief in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Copp. 4 9 In Deepsouth, Latraim held a
patent for a shrimp deveining machine.5 0 Deepsouth made the parts of
Latraim's patented machine and sold those parts abroad.51 Those parts were
then assembled for use abroad.5 2 United States Patent Law prohibits making
and selling a patented machine, but at the time Deepsouth was decided, patent
law did not prohibit making and selling parts of a patented machine.5 3 Thus,
the Supreme Court held that Deepsouth did not infringe Latraim's patent.5 4
In direct response to this decision, Congress enacted § 271(f), which made it
an act of infringement to supply components of a patented machine.55
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit focused on the mischief that § 271(f) was
designed to remedy and interpreted § 271(f) in a way that would combat that
mischief.56
In contrast, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's purposivist
approach to interpreting 5 271(f) and advocated a textual interpretation of
"component."57 The Court reasoned that Congress could have chosen words
such as "information, instructions, or tools from which those components
readily may be generated," but it did not.5 8 Further, the Court noted that
45. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 451.
46. AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1371.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1972).
50. Id. at 519.
51. Id. at 523.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 532.
54. Id.
55. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444-45 (2007).
56. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
57. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 451-59.
58. Id. at 451.
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271 (f) contains no textual indication that ease of copying is a relevant factor in
determining liability.s 9 Finally, the Court explained that the loophole was for
Congress to consider, not for the courts to close as they saw fit.60 Thus,
based on a textualist interpretation of § 271(f), the Supreme Court held that
Microsoft did not infringe AT&T's patent under § 271(). 61
Ii. Analysis: The Problems with Textualism in Patent Law
This note argues that textualism was an improper approach to
interpreting 5 271(), as applied to the facts of Microsoft v. AT&T. More
broadly, it is improper to examine patent statutes from a strict textualist lens
when a fact pattern concerns technological advances in patent law. Instead,
purposivism should be a considerable force behind the interpretation of
patent statutes.
One notable problem with textualism is that it assumes the statutory text
offers a complete and reasonably determinate source of meaning, but often it
does not.62 Strict textualism's requirement of staying within the confines of
the text exacerbates this problem; one must determine statutory meaning
without reference to context. 63 When the text of a statute is applied to fact
patterns unforeseen by the legislature, it becomes likely that the statutory text
will fail to reveal a complete and reasonably determinate meaning. This is
especially true when the text of a patent statute is applied to future technology
because the words to describe that future technology may not have existed at
the time the statute was enacted. 64 In such a case, it is difficult to see how a
determinate meaning could be gleaned from the statutory text that is applied
to unforeseen future technology. This is one reason why textualism should
not be the sole statutory regime in the area of patent law.
Many statutes suffer from this problem. The legislature drafts statutes
from a predictive angle, keeping in mind that society and technology are in a
state of constant flux. However, this problem is heightened in patent law
because the very goal of patent law is to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." 65 Patent law, by its very nature, is a uniquely hyper-dynamic area
of law. As a result, patent law naturally encounters a formidable number of
novel situations, both in volume and in frequency in the courts. When dealing
with a legal issue in patent law, the Court necessarily grapples with inventive
59. Id. at 453.
60. Id. at 457.
61. Id. at 458.
62. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 341.
63. Id. at 342.
64. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. C1. 1967).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8 (emphasis added).
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technology. Thus, patent law has a special need for statutes that can be
applicable to unforeseen situations.
Despite these concerns, supporters of textualism defend the theory on
grounds of reliance and predictability: "citizens ought to be able to read the
statute books and know their rights and duties. '66  However, when a
determinate meaning cannot be discerned from the text, these justifications
for textualism are insufficient. Without a determinate textual meaning of the
statute, reasonable reliance and predictability are untenable. Regarding patent
statutes, the situation will often be that a determinate meaning cannot be
discerned from the statutory text. Words written in the past will be applied to
technological advances made after enactment of the statute. Thus, reliance on
and predictability from patent statutes will be relatively rare.
This is not to say that statutory text should be disregarded completely.
On the contrary, the statutory text is always the best place to start when
interpreting a statute. 67 The point is that the Supreme Court in Microsoft v.
AT&T was too strict in adhering only to textualism, without any heed to
purposivism, especially in light of the unique nature of patent law.
IV. Proposal: Interpretation of Patent Statutes Should be Guided
by Claim Construction Doctrines
A. Patent Statutes and Claims are Analogous
Patent law recognizes textualism's deficiencies and accommodates those
deficiencies with a number of doctrines of claim construction.
In patent law, the claim language delineates the metes and bounds of the
inventor's patent rights.6 8 Thus, construing the meaning of claim terms is
central to determining the scope of the invention and the rights of the patent
holder.69 For example, in Phillips v. AWH Cotp., whether the defendant
infringed plaintiffs patent hinged on whether the term "baffles" in plaintiffs
patent covered baffles at right angles to a wall, or only baffles at oblique
angles to a wall.70 If the former, the defendant infringed, but if the latter, the
defendant did not infringe.71 In another case, the Federal Circuit explained
that "[i]mproper claim construction [could] distort the entire infringement
66. Eskridge & Frickey, st pra note 4, at 340.
67. Id.
68. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
69. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
70. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1309.
71. Id.
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analysis. 72 Similarly, in Microsoft v. AT&T, Microsoft's liability hinged on the
interpretation of the term "components" in § 271(). 73
In fact, claim construction and statutory construction are analogous in
many respects. Black's Law Dictionary defines "statute" as "[a] law passed by a
legislative body .... ,,4 and defines "law" as "[t]he regime that orders human
activities and relations ... .,,75 A criminal statute, for instance, is "[a] law that
defines, classifies, and sets forth punishment for one or more specific
crimes."' 76 Similarly, a patent claim delineates the scope of the invcntor's
monopoly right-as determined by the exact nature of his invention-and
anyone who infringes that right is liable.77 Thus, both claim drafting and
statute drafting entail using words to convey an abstract, imprecise, but
prodigious concept. In construing those words, both claim construction and
statutory interpretation involve transforming abstractions into precise
contours to apply to specific facts. Further, both claims and statutes serve the
purpose of providing notice to the public at large of what is legal and not
legal. 78 Thus, only one correct interpretation applies to all persons. 79
Patent law has developed a number of doctrines of claim construction,
some of which are direct consequences of the imprecision of words used in
describing inventions.80 Such words do not suddenly gain precision when
taken out of the context of patent claims and put into patent statutes.
Accordingly, claim construction doctrines should inform the interpretation of
patent statutes.
B. Claim Construction Involves Reference to Sources Other than the Claim
Itself
A principle doctrine of claim construction is that "words of a claim are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning." 81 At first blush, this
tenet of claim construction appears similar to the "plain meaning rule."
However, claim terms are not construed in a vacuum.82 Rather, the ordinary
and customary meaning of a claim term is discerned by reference to sources
other than the claim itself, such as the specification and prosecution history.83
72. KfyMfg. Group, 925 F.2d at 1448.
73. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 446-47 (2007).
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (8th ed. 2004).
75. Id. at 900.
76. Id. at 1448.
77. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
78. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
79. Id.
80. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
81. Phillps, 415 F.3d at 1312.
82. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
83. Pbilhps, 415 F.3d at 1313.
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Patent law allows reference to sources outside of the claim itself because it
recognizes the importance of context in interpreting inherently imprecise
words that are used to describe inventive technology. 84
The patent specification is one important source of context that can
illuminate the meaning of a claim term. 85 The patent specification describes
what the claimed invention is and how to make and use it.86 The specification
"is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."8 7
Prosecution history is another source for illuminating the meaning of a
claim term. 88 The patent prosecution history is a record of the proceedings
between the inventor and the Patent Office during the period when the
inventor applies for a patent.89 It represents a negotiation, during which the
inventor attempts to obtain a patent. 90 It provides evidence of how the
inventor regarded his invention.91
Just as the claim interpreter is allowed to, even encouraged to, look to
sources beyond the claim, so too should the patent statute interpreter look to
sources other than the statutory text. One such notable source of statutory
interpretation is legislative history. In fact, legislative history and prosecution
history share many similarities. Legislative history, in the same way as
prosecution history, represents a negotiation. Further, both provide evidence
of the drafters' view of the subject matter at hand, a view that came from
dialogue and deliberation.
Concededly, legislative history has been criticized for being more
confusing than clarifying,92 just as prosecution history has been criticized for
lacking clarity. 93 For this reason, the Federal Circuit has held that prosecution
history is less useful as an interpretive source of claim construction.94
However, patent law recognizes that prosecution history can be a valuable
interpretive source in the right circumstances. 95  Patent law does not
categorically condemn any and all resort to prosecution history as an
84. Medrad, 401 F.3d at 1319.
85. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cit. 1996).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
87. Vitmnics, 90 F.3d at 1582.




92. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that
legislative history is indeterminate, and therefore confusing).
93. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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interpretive source.96 Similarly, although there is nothing directly analogous
to the specification in patent statutes, patent law recognizes the importance of
resorting to sources outside of the legally operative words themselves.
C. Patent Law Accommodates the Inability of Words to Keep Up with the
Pace of Inventions
Two other doctrines of claim construction stem directly from the
recognition that words are imperfect at describing inventions. It proves
particularly problematic to describe inventions because words are unable to
keep up with the pace of innovation. 97 Because an invention is, by definition,
new, words do not always exist to describe an invention.98 To overcome this
lag, patent law provides two doctrines of claim interpretation. First, an
inventor is his own lexicographer. 99 That is, an inventor has license to make
up and define words in any way he chooses. Second, the role of dictionaries
in claim interpretation is deemphasized. 1°° Since an inventor has license to
define his own words, and the inventor did not write the dictionary, the
dictionary meaning of words can conflict with the proper meaning of claim
terms. 10 1 While consultation with a dictionary is not inappropriate when
interpreting claim terms, the inventor's definition of a term, as provided in the
claims, specification, and prosecution history, is paramount over the
dictionary's meaning of the term. 102
These two doctrines of claim construction arose to accommodate the
difficulty of describing inventions with existing vocabulary. This inadequacy
of words is no different in patent statutes than in patent claims. Thus,
interpretation of patent statutes should be flexible enough to accommodate
for the inherent imprecision of words.
D. The Doctrine of Equivalents Can Expand the Literal Scope of a Patent
Claim
Finally, the doctrine of claim interpretation that stands in most contrast to
textualism is the Doctrine of Equivalents. The Doctrine of Equivalents
allows a patentee to expand the scope of his patent right beyond the literal
scope of his claims. 10 3 Thus, even if a product or process does not fit the
96. Id.
97. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. C1. 1967).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Pbil ps, 415 F.3d at 1321-22.
101. Id. at 1321.
102. Id. at 1322-23.
103. 5B DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2007)
(1978).
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literal definition of the invention provided by a patent claim, it may still be
held to infringe the patent claim under the Doctrine of Equivalents. 104
One purpose behind the Doctrine of Equivalents is to prevent
unscrupulous copyists from making unimportant and insubstantial changes to
the invention that would take the copied matter outside the literal scope of the
claim. 05 In other words, the Doctrine of Equivalents exists to protect the
benefit of the invention. 06 Without the Doctrine of Equivalents, the value of
a patent could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.' 0 7 The Supreme Court
has reasoned that "[ilf patents were always interpreted by their literal terms,
their value would be greatly diminished."' 108 The unscrupulous copyist of a
patented invention also exists in the realm of patent statutes-he is the one
who exploits loopholes in patent statutes. Because the rule of law prohibits
the unscrupulous copyist from stealing the benefit of an invention, it should
also prohibit the loophole exploiter from bypassing the snares of a patent
statute.
Another purpose behind the Doctrine of Equivalents is to allow the
inventor to capture future technology. 10 9  Often, future technology is
unforeseeable by the inventor and thus impossible to describe, yet the future
technology emerges substantially the same as the inventor's creation.1 1 0
Patent law allows a patent holder to reach such after-arising technology
through the Doctrine of Equivalents. Similarly, patent statutes should also
reach such after-arising technology. Just as the Federal Circuit reasoned in
AT&T v. Microsoft, courts should not permit "a technical avoidance of the
statute by ignoring the advances in a field of technology-and its associated
industry practices-that developed after the enactment of 5 271(f)."Il The
Federal Circuit's reasoning behind its interpretation of 5 271(f) is analogous to
that of the Doctrine of Equivalents. In Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., the
Federal Circuit Court explained the rationale behind the Doctrine of
Equivalents: "an embellishment made possible by technological advances may
not permit an accused device to escape the web of infringement." 112
These purposes behind the Doctrine of Equivalents stem from the insight
that it is unreasonable to expect an inventor to draft impenetrable claim
104. Id.
105. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
106. Id.
107. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
108. Id.
109. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
110. Id.
111. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
112. Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 326 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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language. 113 Claim language that contemplates future technology is especially
problematic. 114 As such, patent law does not require an inventor to predict
and describe every conceivable embodiment of his invention." 5 It is similarly
unreasonable to expect Congress to draft perfect impenetrable language in a
patent statute that encompasses all fact situations, including unforeseeable fact
situations involving future technology.
It may seem that, because Congress has the opportunity to amend a
statute once it realizes an unforeseen problem, while an inventor cannot, the
inventor has more of a need for doctrines such as the Doctrine of
Equivalents. However, through the Reissue Application process, the inventor
actually does have an opportunity to amend his claims after his patent issues,
similar to Congress' ability to amend statutes." 6 The Reissue process allows
the patentee to return to the Patent Office to obtain broader claims under
certain situations." 7 Thus, Congress and inventors can fairly face similar
standards for drafting. Namely, Congress should not be required to predict
and describe every conceivable situation where the statute might be
applicable, as inventors are not imposed with such a requirement.
There must be some guiding principle circumscribing the expansion of
claim meaning beyond its literal meaning. The "triple identity" test is one test
for determining equivalence. 118 The "triple identity" test provides that a
product accused of infringement is deemed equivalent to the claimed
invention if the accused product performs substantially the same function, in
substantially the same way, to yield substantially the same result as the claimed
invention." 9 Under a second test, an accused product is deemed equivalent if
there is only an insubstantial change between the accused product and the
invention. 20 Each test may be more suited to one case or another, depending
on the facts of each case. 121  One might call these tests a search for the
"spirit" of the claimed invention. In other words, an accused product is
deemed an equivalent if it infringes the "spirit" of the claimed invention.
Just as the spirit of the invention guides application of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, the spirit of the statute should guide interpretation of a patent
statute. Indeed, a similar principle guides purposivism in statutory
113. Festo, 535 U.S. at 731.
114. Il/aro, 436 F.3d at 1376.
115. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
117. Id.
118. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997).
119. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
120. Id. at 610.
121. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
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interpretation. As Justice Brewer famously said in Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, "[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit ... "122
Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute at issue by following the
spirit of the statute instead of the letter of the statute. 23
Proponents of textualism argue that following the spirit of a statute could
distort the literal meaning of the statutory text and thus erode public notice.1 24
A similar criticism exists as to the Doctrine of Equivalents. 25 Critics of the
Doctrine of Equivalents argue that it has the potential to erode public notice
because the public may not be able to rely on the literal meaning of a claim. 126
However, the Doctrine of Equivalents does not provide free reign to
interpret claim scope in any way one chooses. Infringement under the
Doctrine of Equivalents is the exception, not the rule, and it is to be applied
cautiously. 127 Courts have placed many restrictions on its use to help preserve
the public notice function of patent claims. For example, the Doctrine of
Equivalents cannot be used to vitiate a claim limitation entirely.128 While the
Doctrine of Equivalents may be used to broaden the meaning of the claim
limitation somewhat, it may not be used to broaden the meaning of the claim
limitation so much that it renders the claim limitation meaningless. 29 Other
limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents include prosecution history
estoppel, 130 public dedication, 131 and ensnaring prior art. 132 Notwithstanding,
the Doctrine of Equivalents is an established doctrine with a long lineage. 133
In the right circumstances, the Doctrine of Equivalents has sound
justifications, while not vitiating the central functions of patent claims. 134
Purposivism should apply to interpretation patent statutes in a similar manner
122. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
123. Id. at 465. (holding that importation of a minister from overseas does not violate the
statute's mandate against "the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens ...to perform
labor in the United States" because the spirit of the statute was directed only against cheap unskilled
labor, not brain toilers or ministers).
124. Eskridge & Frickey, sapra note 4, at 340.
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129. Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219 (W.D.
Wash. 2003).
130. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737-38 (2002).
131. Johnson &Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cit. 2002).
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1990).
133. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103.
134. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
APPLYING THE RATIONALES OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
to the way the Doctrine of Equivalents applies in construction of patent
claims.
V. Conclusion
In Microsoft v. AT&T, the Supreme Court was too rigid in only looking at
the text of 35 U.S.C. 5 271(f). In contrast, the Federal Circuit took the more
appropriate approach when it explained that "[§] 271(f), if it is to remain
effective, must therefore be interpreted in a manner that is appropriate to the
nature of the technology at issue."'135 The court reasoned that permitting
Microsoft to escape liability would be tantamount to "subverting the remedial
nature of 5 271(f), permitting a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring
the advances in a field of technology-and its associated industry practices-
that developed after the enactment of 5 271(."'136
Whenever a fact pattern calls for applying a patent statute to a situation
involving unforeseen technology, such as in Microsoft v. AT&T, courts should
not exclusively utilize textualism, nor should they categorically disregard
purposivism.
Intrinsic traits of patent law make textualism especially problematic in the
context of patent statutes. Given that patent law governs inventions, which,
by definition, are new, adequate words do not always exist to fully describe an
invention. 137  In addition, because the very purpose of patent law is to
promote innovation, 138 patent law will encounter a daunting number of
unforeseen circumstances. Patent law thus has a higher need for flexible
statutes than other areas of law.
Patent law recognizes the problems associated with adhering to a literal
meaning of a word used to describe an invention. To account for this, a
number of doctrines of claim construction have developed. The Supreme
Court's approach to claim construction should enlighten how patent statutes
should be interpreted.
First, context is important in claim construction. 139 The specification and
prosecution history are valuable sources in construing the meaning of a claim
term.140 Second, patent law recognizes that the English language cannot keep
up with the pace of inventions.' 4 ' Patent law accommodates by allowing the
inventor to be his own lexicographer 142 and deemphasizes the role of
135. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
136. Id.
137. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. C1. 1967).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
139. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
141. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397.
142. Id.
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dictionaries in claim construction. 143 Lastly, the Doctrine of Equivalents
allows the patentee to expand his patent rights beyond the literal scope of his
claim, as long as the "spirit" of the invention is not lost. 144
Patent law recognizes sound reasons for not confining claim scope to its
strict literal text, in certain situations. These same reasons are no different in
the world of interpreting patent statutes. Therefore, patent statutes, similar to
patent claims, should be flexible enough to accommodate for unscrupulous
loophole exploiters and unforeseen technologies.
143. Phils, 415 F.3d at 1321-22.
144. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103.
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